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Contemporary approaches to multi-organisational response planning for the management of complex volcanic
crises assume that identifying the types of expertise needed provides the foundation for effective response. We
discuss why this is only one aspect, and present the social, psychological and organizational issues that need to be
accommodated to realize the full benefits of multi-agency collaboration. We discuss the need to consider how
organizational culture, inter-agency trust, mental models, information management and communication and
decision making competencies and processes, need to be understood and accommodated in crisis management
planning and delivery. This paper discusses how these issues can be reconciled within superordinate (overarching)
management structures designed to accommodate multi-agency response that incorporates decision-making inputs
from both the response management team and the science advisors. We review the science advisory processes
within New Zealand (NZ), and discuss lessons learnt from research into the inter-organisational response to historical
eruptions and exercises in NZ. We argue that team development training is essential and review the different types of
training and exercising techniques (including cross training, positional rotation, scenario planning, collaborative
exercises, and simulations) which can be used to develop a coordinated capability in multiagency teams. We argue that
to truly enhance the science response, science agencies must learn from the emergency management sector and
embark on exercise and simulation programs within their own organisations, rather than solely participating as external
players in emergency management exercises. We thus propose a science-led tiered exercise program, with example
exercise scenarios, which can be used to enhance both the internal science response and the interagency response to
a national or international event, and provide direction for the effective writing and conduct of these exercises.
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Communication1 Introduction
During a volcanic crisis, whether an isolated period of
unrest or a full scale eruption and recovery, many agen-
cies and organisations are involved in its response and
management. These range from expert and technical advi-
sors (e.g., geologists, geophysicists, engineers, and social
scientists), through to emergency management agencies
(civil defence, fire service, police, army, national and local
government) and lifeline organisations (lines companies,
transport, water). For example, during the 1980 eruptions* Correspondence: e.e.hudson-doyle@massey.ac.nz
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in any medium, provided the original work is pof Mt St Helens, over 130 officials and organisations
responded (Saarinen and Sell 1985); during the eruptive
episodes of 1995 to 1996 in Ruapehu, NZ, over 42 organisa-
tions were involved (Paton et al. 1998a), and in the 2012 Te
Maari eruptions of NZ, some 30 organisations responded.
The number of responding agencies increases as the
unrest or eruptive period continues, and they need to
collaborate and share knowledge to effectively respond
in a crisis that creates multiple, diverse consequences.
However, these organizations bring to the crisis manage-
ment context diverse operational roles, different organiza-
tional objectives and political or economic pressures, and
varied ways of interpreting, prioritizing and responding to
issues that reflect organizational policies, practices andOpen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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and control practices to the more organic approach typical
of scientific/research organizations. Ensuring that agency
representatives can integrate their knowledge and ex-
pertise for response planning and implementation, and en-
suring that they can continue to do so in a response
environment that present complex, dynamic demands that
need to be understood and managed over time, is a chal-
lenging task. We present here a literature review of the
factors influencing response effectiveness, and discuss sev-
eral approaches that have been developed to achieve an ef-
fective coordinated outcome, as well as how they could be
integrated into the volcanology community to enhance and
inform the response of volcanologists in the unique man-
agement environment created by volcanic crises. In the
context of this literature, we also review and evaluate exam-
ples of NZ volcanic science advice and response practices.
First we discuss the development of science advisory
groups in New Zealand since one of the earliest vol-
canic exercises run in 1992 (Section 2). We then discuss
psychological, social and organizational influences and
practices that affect response effectiveness (Section 3) and
argue for the need for regular training activities to im-
prove these competencies (Section 4). In doing so, we
summarize the benefits accruing from science agencies
learning from the methods that emergency management
agencies routinely use, and embarking on exercise and
simulation programs that mirror the complexities of the
response environment in which they will make important,
but non-routine, contributions within their own organisa-
tions. The paper argues that such in-house training (e.g.,
involving cross training, positional rotation, scenario plan-
ning, collaborative exercises, simulations, training and
shared exercise writing tasks see Sections 4 and 5) is piv-
otal to developing the future response capability of science
advisory groups and their ability to effectively complement
the emergency management functions they will inevitably
interact with. We also review national and international
Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) exer-
cises (Section 5) to highlight the benefits that can arise if
scientists develop their own activities rather than solely
participating as external players in emergency manage-
ment exercises. Following a review of NZ’s 2008 “All of
nation” volcanic Exercise Ruaumoko (Section 5.2) to illus-
trate how effective evaluation informs the development of
Volcanic Science Advisory Group (VSAG) processes with-
in NZ, the paper concludes with our proposing, in
Section 6, a new exercise structure for volcanology.
This will facilitate the integration of volcanological expert-
ise into CDEM processes and how scientists and scientific
agencies can proactively contribute to and capitalise on op-
portunities to enhance shared understanding between di-
verse responding agencies. Throughout this paper, we
consider science and science advice providers to representthe expert source of information on hazard processes (e.g.
geology, geophysics, geochemistry, geodesy, atmospheric
science) and the expert source of information on social
and economic impacts, including communication and be-
haviours (as provided by the ‘Social Consequences’ sub-
advisory group of Exercise Ruaumoko; Smith 2009).
Incorporating a wide range of expertise into an advis-
ory group process is closely related to the concept of
‘post-normal’ science (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1991; Krauss
et al. 2012) which is a ‘new conception of the manage-
ment of complex science-related issues’ (Funtowicz &
Ravetz 2003, p. 1) where ‘facts are uncertain, values are
in dispute, the stakes are high and decisions urgent’
(Funtowicz & Ravetz 1991, p. 137), particularly when
these uncertainties are of an epistemological or ethical
kind. Post-normal science considers these elements of
uncertainty, value loading, and a plurality of legitimate
perspectives to be integral to science, and that by adopt-
ing this ‘post-normal’ approach there is a recognition
that risks are interpreted and managed subjectively (de-
pending on local values and norms as well as disciplinary
frameworks). This approach presents a new problem-
solving framework and acknowledges that a plurality of
perspectives should be structured into the informed deci-
sion making processes during uncertain high risk environ-
ments (see WSS Fellows on RIA 2014).
2 The development of volcanic science advisory
groups in NZ
One of the earliest exercises conducted to explore the
response to a volcanic eruption in New Zealand was Ex-
ercise Nga Puia in 1992 (Martin 1992). This exercise,
based on a simulated eruption at the Okataina Volcanic
Centre (Nairn 2010), informed the response plans for
the region, in particular the subsequent volcanic alert
level processes. A few years later, these lessons were
tested during the unrest and eruptions of Ruapehu volcano
in 1995–1996, when over 42 organisations responded, with
the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Science (now GNS
Science) acting as the major science provider (Johnston
et al. 2000) (Figure 1).
Analysis of the organizational response to these erup-
tions (Paton et al. 1998a) identified the prominent role
the limited formalised inter-organisational networking
played in creating a coordinated response, particularly
with regard to issues arising from ad-hoc interaction be-
tween science and response agencies. Response agencies
became inappropriately over reliant on science agencies
for management information. Paton et al. (1998a; 1999)
found that response agencies expected the geophysicists
and volcanologists analysing volcanic activity to provide
them with direct answers to all response management is-
sues. For example, one co-author (DJ) reported how re-
sponse agencies expected volcanologists to be able to
Figure 1 The information flow during the response to the 1995
Ruapehu Eruption showing information flow between key
agencies (Paton et al. 1999).
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Response agencies were unprepared for the need to be able
to liaise with different expert sources (e.g. volcanologists,
agricultural scientists, and veterinarians) to integrate input
for multiple sources to make response management deci-
sions. Similar problems emerged with regard to public
health, environmental health, and utility issues. In addition
to expecting certainty about volcanic hazard characteristics
and future activity, response problems emanated from lack
of attention in the response planning context given to un-
derstanding what sources of expertise would need to be
consulted and how response management would need to
integrate and interpret information while collaborating
with diverse others. At the same time, the lack of network-
ing meant that many agencies were unable to fully utilize
scientific data as agencies found it was inconsistent with
(unexpected) situational awareness and decision demands,
discussed further in Section 3.
As a result, science advisory processes were redeveloped
through the formation of a number of VSAGs (Smith 2009;
Jolly and Smith 2012). During many natural hazard events,
such science advisory bodies have been called upon to pro-
vide information and advice. The ability to source science
advice through “one trusted source”, such as the VSAG,
has proved beneficial (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emer-
gency Management, MCDEM 2008) (Figure 2a). This ap-
proach also facilitates an integration of a wide range of
expert opinions required to manage uncertainty duringdecision making (Lipshitz et al. 2001) and can help com-
bat issues arising from conflict between scientists (Barclay
et al. 2008).
These VSAGs represent advisory bodies that are on
standby, and have plans to respond to a crisis or unrest
period. The advice provided by VSAGs is vital for effect-
ive emergency management planning, intelligence gath-
ering, and decision making and for the protection of life,
infrastructure and welfare, and depending on local pro-
cedures, the VSAG may exclusively include scientists
(volcanologists, meteorologists, etc.) or also include local
and regional emergency managers and officials. In NZ,
the earliest formalised VSAG was the Egmont Volcanic
Advisory Group formed in the early 1990s alongside the
deployment of the Taranaki Volcano Seismic Network
(for a full history see Bayley 2004), which meets once a
year to review the monitoring data and other scientific
research. By 2004, this group comprised representatives
from Massey University, University of Auckland, GNS
Science (NZ Crown Research Institute for “Earth, geoscience
and isotope research and consultancy services”, GNS
Science Website 2014), Department of Conservation and
Taranaki Regional Council; and sat at the advisory group
level of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management
Coordinating Executive Group.
This group advised Taranaki Regional Council in the
development of its first Volcanic Contingency Plan in
2000, which addressed the framework of Scientific Alert
Levels, the principal emergency management activities for
response, the expected hazards and the monitoring net-
work. Nowadays the Egmont Volcanic Advisory Group has
evolved into the Taranaki Seismic and Volcanic Advisory
Group (TSVAG), encompassing additional representatives
from Victoria University of Wellington, MCDEM, the Earth-
quake Commission, and local CDEM groups (TRC 2013).
The experiences of the TSVAG have helped inform the
process and formation of a number of other VSAGs
throughout NZ, many of which have overlapping member-
ship in terms of volcanologists and national level CDEM
and response organisations, most of these contain represen-
tatives from local CDEM, response and lifeline organisa-
tions and scientists from across the NZ Universities, and
Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) including GNS Science:
 The Auckland Volcanic Scientific Advisory Group
(AVSAG) was established by the Auckland Civil
Defence and Emergency Management Group in
2007 as part of its Volcanic Contingency Plan and in
preparation for the MCDEM led volcanic Exercise
Ruaumoko, to provide advice to officials about the
volcanic field residing under Auckland City
(MCDEM 2008; McDowell 2008; Smith 2009). This
built on the pre-existing VSAG mechanisms
established in the 2002 Contingency Plan (Beca
Figure 2 Information flow processes during a NZ Volcanic crisis. (a) The information flow during Exercise Ruaumoko in 2008, outlining the
operating structure of the Auckland Volcanic Scientific Advisory Group and its relationship to GeoNet and CDEM (Smith 2009). (b) The proposed
model for a national hazard science advisory group, to enable integration of nationwide science capability, as proposed by Smith (2009) after Exercise
Ruaumoko. Smith (2009) states that “this advisory group would be made up of appropriate subject experts from across universities, crown research
institutes and other science organisations including consultancies, [and] … could play both an operational role (during events) and a strategic role for
planning science activities” (p. 76). The current advisory structure of the CPVAG, TVSAG, and CAG reflect a similar advisory process (Jolly and Smith 2012).
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volcanologists (from GNS Science, Auckland
Regional Council, and University of Auckland),
meteorologists, and specialist medical advisors. In
2007, AVSAG was the first NZ VSAG to establish
formal terms of reference that were signed by
member organisations (Cronin 2008), and this
updated VSAG incorporated a wider range of
representatives from Auckland, Waikato and Massey
Universities, GNS Science, MetService, the Kestrel
Group, as well as local and national CDEM
representatives (Smith 2009).
 The Central Plateau Volcanic Advisory Group
(CPVAG) was established in 2008 to “provide a
forum for the collective planning and readinessactivities for volcanic hazards in the Central Plateau”
which includes the volcanoes Mt. Ruapehu, Mt.
Ngauruhoe, and Mt. Tongariro (CPVAG 2009, p. 5).
This group formed directly in response to the dam
break lahar that occurred from the Ruapehu Crater
Lake in 2007, and the recognition by key
stakeholders that a combined expanded advisory
group was needed for effective planning,
preparedness, relationship building, and inter-agency
coordination (ibid). CPVAG encompasses a Science
Focus Group, a Planning Focus Group and a
Communications Focus Group, all guided by a
framework strategy and Contingency Plan, and who
meet every six months to report back on work
programmes, outcomes, and future plans. The
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2012 during the Te Maari eruption and unrest
period, and the evaluation of that response is
currently ongoing as the eruption represents a critical
opportunity to review effectiveness, and identify areas
for improvement and capacity building.
 The fourth VSAG in NZ is the Caldera Advisory
Group (CAG, Waikato Regional Council 2014;
Potter et al. 2012), which was formed in late 2010,
with a focus on the eight caldera volcanoes in the
Taupo Volcanic Zone. This group formed in
response to the recognition of a gap in the advice
provision available for the particular effects of
caldera volcanoes, and an acknowledgment that
these effects could last for significant time periods
(years to decades) with a “profound impact on the
social and economic environments” (Waikato
Regional Council 2014).
Similar science advisory group processes also exist for
other hazards in NZ including the Tsunami Expert
Panel, which activates in response to a local, regional, or
distant source earthquake and tsunami warning. This
advises officials of coastal regions at risk, expected tsu-
nami arrival times and durations, and the expected max-
imum wave amplitudes at the coast, providing advice
directly to the Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency
Management response team (MCDEM 2010).
More recently, during the 2010–2012 earthquake and
aftershock sequence in the Canterbury region, the Natural
Hazards Research Platform assumed the role of national
coordinator of science advice when the government de-
clared a State of National Emergency after the fatal M6.3
event in February 2011 (Canterbury Earthquakes Royal
Commission – Te Komihana Rūwhenua o Waitaha 2012).
This government funded multi-party research manage-
ment platform was established in 2009 to provide secure,
long-term funding for natural hazard research, to encour-
age stakeholder involvement in research, and to promote
collaborative research (Natural Hazards Research Platform
2009). In future natural hazards events, and based upon
the Canterbury experiences, the various scientific advisory
group sections of the wider volcanic advisory groups de-
scribed above would likely fall under the coordination of
the Natural Hazards Platform, or a future equivalent, as
they fulfil their science advisory role; pending reviews of
recent volcanic eruptions and earthquake events of the last
4 years, and changes currently under consideration for
new national funding procedures.
AVSAG was the first VSAG to be comprehensively
tested in a simulation. This was done through Exercise
Ruaumoko, which was a MCDEM led exercise to test an
all of nation response to a volcanic eruption in the
Auckland volcanic field (MCDEM 2008) and was thefirst test of AVSAG. For this, AVSAG was co-ordinated
through a tri-partite sub-group system (Volcanology,
Volcano Monitoring, Social Consequences), which re-
ported upwards to a smaller core VSAG that liaised dir-
ectly with MCDEM and Auckland CDEM via on-site
liaison officers in the Emergency Operation Centres
(EOCs) at each location (see reviews in: Smith 2009; Doyle
& Johnston 2011).
Reviews of this exercise (MCDEM 2008; McDowell
2008; Cronin 2008) identified that the AVSAG process
facilitated the provision of valuable advice in a clear,
timely manner. As advocated for by the International
Association for Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth’s
Interior (1999), the AVSAG provided a facility for the sci-
entists (from all contributing disciplines) to “use a single
voice”, share information to reduce confusion, and to en-
courage efficient teamwork amongst scientists and public
officials, while also encouraging integration of diverse sci-
entific expertise and minimising communication delays.
However, during the most active periods of the response
towards the end of the exercise, the existence of two dis-
tinctly separate scientific sub-groups composed of the pre-
dominately university-based ‘volcanology’ group and the
‘monitoring’ group of GNS Science based scientists be-
came unrealistic, and as stated by McDowell (2008), p. 22,
the priority instead should be to have “the rapid assess-
ment and decision-making in relation to technical data”
rather than maintaining and communicating between
these two separate groups. While the main advantage of
this AVSAG approach was the wide range of scientific ex-
perts and competency, during the most active period the
due process needed to maintain this inclusivity actually
slowed down advice provision (MCDEM 2008).
A clear advantage during the exercise was the presence
of a science advisor in both the National Crisis Management
Centre (NCMC) and the Auckland CDEM Group EOC,
providing a vital link between the VSAG assessment and
the emergency management decision-making. However,
during the rapid escalation of unrest and the critical mo-
ments of the crisis, there was a potential for disconnect to
occur between this local and national advice provision to
the AGEOC and the NCMC respectively, and this resulted
in a divergence of the science advice (which was informing
evacuation planning) at Local and National levels (Cronin
2008, discussed further in Section 5.2).
A potential disconnect could also occur not only be-
tween the science advice at the local and national CDEM
level, but also between the local and national science
research response, capability, and processes in future
events. Smith (2009) suggests that to address these limi-
tations and coordinate the scientific advice beyond the
limited knowledge pool and resources in a locally im-
pacted area, a nationwide Volcanic Science Advisory
Panel (NZVAP) should have (see Figure 2b):
Doyle et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2015) 4:1 Page 6 of 26 “at its core national hazard monitoring capability
and processes (e.g. GeoNet), with involvement of
additional capability from universities and other
science organisations based on thresholds of
response. The intent is that GeoNet (both the
technology and the science expertise of GNS Science)
be the hub of any science response for earthquake,
volcano, tsunami or landslide events” (p. 77).
GeoNet is a collaboration between the Earthquake
Commission (EQC - NZ’s insurance provider for natural
disasters; EQC Website 2014) and GNS Science and is
the “official source of geological hazard information for
New Zealand”. Established in 2001 it monitors geoha-
zards (in particular earthquakes, tsunami, volcanoes and
landslides) via an extensive monitoring system and arch-
ival data centre, and provides public and official infor-
mation including earthquake reports and Volcanic Alert
Bulletins (GeoNet website 2014). The NZVAP approach
outlined by Smith (2009), encompassing GeoNet at its
core, still supports the existence of regions having exist-
ing scientific or planning advisory groups with a volcanic
and/or earthquake focus, but it also addresses the need
for mobilisation of NZ-wide science capability, while
remaining responsive to local CDEM needs (see also
Section 5.2; Jolly and Smith 2012).
Developing VSAGs prior to an event can prospectively
enhance the crisis response capability of scientists and the
full multi-agency response alike, through the development
of terms and protocols for response, information sharing
and inter-agency management, and situational awareness.
A prospective approach facilitates future collaboration
(e.g., enhanced mental models, shared situational awareness,
enhanced multi-team performance) and more effective com-
munications between scientists and responding agencies.
3 Factors that influence response effectiveness
Even with a pre-existing VSAG, the development of effect-
ive multi-agency response needs to accommodate issues
arising from, for example, differences in organisational
culture, jurisdictional expectations, and differences in the
economic and political pressures on participating agencies.
These represent demands on the goal of prioritising
tasks and information needs over and above those em-
anating from the complex, evolving volcanic hazard.
The corresponding threats to trust, leadership or team
ability, conflicts over responsibility or priorities, reputation
management, and need to function under high psycho-
logical and environmental stressors (fatigue, tunnel vision,
family commitments and over work) conspire to impair
performance of the individual and team (Boin and’t Hart
2001; Handmer 2008; Quarantelli 1997; Sinclair et al.
2012b; Paton 1996). In addition, conflict may arise asindividuals swap hierarchal/seniority position as they
move from their day-to-day role to their response role.
To manage these issues, it is essential to build future
response capability via the development of good team
and inter team mental models. This facilitates situational
awareness and enhanced decision making capability for
personnel within the VSAG and key responding agen-
cies. This should be supported by training (Sections 4
and 5) and resource planning (e.g., accommodating the
need to coordinate multiple shifts throughout a re-
sponse, manage fatigue, allow individuals to attend to
personal and family demands) that ensures that staff can
return to their role with a fresh perspective. Limiting
time on shift has pragmatic benefits in reducing re-
sponse risks from personnel adapting to small incre-
mental change and losing situational awareness (e.g.
Tickell 1990). In contrast, a fresh responder/scientist
would recognise a significant change demanding an ac-
tion. This tendency, colloquially referred to as the ‘boiling
frog syndrome’a, was particularly noticed in the volcanolo-
gist’s experience when managing the 1991 eruption at
Mt. Pinatubo (Whittlesey and Buckner 1993), and high-
lights the need for regular shift rotation of scientists and
other responders in crisis response.
It is also important to consider rotating the role of the
lead science individual (or agency) within a VSAG dur-
ing a response, particularly for long duration crises. In a
NZ context for example, many of the responding scien-
tists will be balancing their ‘response role’ (to provide
advice to responding agencies and understand the phe-
nomena occurring) with their ‘day-to-day role’ (including
funded research, consultancy contracts and lecturing).
The ‘day-to-day role’ may need to take priority at times,
and thus by rotating the role of ‘lead’ individual (or
agency), this will allow time and space to respond to these
other competing demands, while also managing issues
around fatigue and tunnel vision as the various agencies
and individuals ‘share the load’. Further, by rotating these
roles, individuals can develop a greater understanding of
each other’s responsibilities, roles, pressures, and demands,
helping to build a better shared mental model of the team
response (see Sections 3.3 and 4.1). For any role swap or
shift change to work effectively an effective change-over pro-
cedure (e.g., role shadowing for a specific time period) is
needed to transfer situational awareness and overall re-
sponse performance. This is essential to maintain deci-
sion making effectiveness in evolving crises.
3.1 Decision making
Pivotal to effective volcanic crisis management are the
decision making, situational awareness, mental models
(which is an individual’s representation or visualisation of
a real system, including concepts, relationships, and their
role within that system) and trust processes that underpin
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overview of the individual and group decision making pro-
cesses occurring in volcanic management and response.
Analytical decision-making is defined by working
through a process: identifying a problem; generating op-
tions to solve the problem; evaluating these; and imple-
menting the preferred option (Flin 1996; Saaty 2008).
This form of decision making requires time to allow this
process to occur. It is the default approach adopted by
scientists (and managers) due to their training. However,
in emergency response a range of other decision making
styles: analytical; naturalistic; procedural based; creative;
and distributive (e.g. Crichton & Flin 2002); are required
and need to be matched to the situation and conditions
encountered by decision-makers.
The slower, more considerate, analytical decision mak-
ing processes lie at one end of a continuum of decisions
styles. At the “faster” end of the decision making con-
tinuum lies naturalistic decision making (NDM; Martin
et al. 1997). This relies on experience garnered through
real world crises as well as simulations and exercises
(Crichton and Flin 2002; Klein 2008). It is commonly
adopted in high risk and low time contexts and natural-
istic settings which involve: ill-structured problems; un-
certain, dynamic environments; shifting, ill-defined, or
competing goals; action/feedback loops; time stress; high
stakes; multiple players; and the effects or pressures of
organizational goals and norms (Orasanu & Connolly
1993, as cited in Zsambok 1997, p. 5). For critical incident
management, research has identified four key NDM pro-
cesses (Crego and Spinks 1997; Crichton and Flin 2002;
Pascual and Henderson 1997): 1) recognition-primed and
intuition led action; 2) a course of action based upon writ-
ten or memorised procedures; 3) analytical comparison of
different options for courses of action; and 4) creative de-
signing of a novel course of action; ordered by increasing
resource commitment.
In a crisis, uncertainty, environmental change, risk and
time pressures are amplified, making decision making
(whether by scientists or responders) in this dynamic con-
text one that is dependent on ‘task conditions’ (Martin et al.
1997), and thus throughout one incident different processes
may be adopted. For example, during Exercise Ruaumoko
(Sections 2.1 and 5.2), the on-site GeoNet duty officers in-
side both the Auckland Group EOC and the NCMC were
often asked to provide answers to questions from key de-
cision makers who required an immediate response due to
response management demands. This “task condition”
(short time) would have favoured the more naturalistic
decision making, where the scientists would have relied
upon their experience to assess the situation (both the
question and the available science) to make an intuitive or
recognition-primed decision (Paton et al. 1999, Klein
1998). However, earlier in the exercise, during the warningperiod preceding the volcanic ‘crisis’ the science advice
could be carefully evaluated and compared, and relatively
lower time pressures afforded scientists and decision
makers the opportunity to adopt an analytical decision
making approach. However, as the situation moved from
this early warning phase into the crisis of impending
eruption, or for a situation where scientists are responding
rapidly after an eruption (e.g. the “Blue Sky” eruption of
Ruapehu in September 2007), the more intuitive naturalis-
tic style would again be adopted. As stated by Paton et al.
1999, “attention must [thus] be directed to understanding
[this] naturalistic decision-making of experts, and how it
can be modelled in simulations to develop this contingent
management capability” (p. 44).
3.2 Situational awareness
Pivotal to effective decision-making process is a capacity
to: 1) evaluate and define a problem and task character-
istic via situation assessment (Endsley 1997; Martin et al.
1997); and 2) select a decision-making strategy from the
four options described above (Crichton and Flin 2002).
The former process is intrinsically dependent upon the
situational awareness (SA) of the individual and the team
(Cannon-Bowers and Bell 1997; Crichton and Flin 2002).
Situational Awareness comprises three levels (Endsley
1997, p. 270–271): 1) Perception – understanding the
importance of information and cues in the environment;
2) Comprehension – combine, interpret, store, and retain
information and be able to use it; and 3) Projection –
prediction of future situations from existing and previous
situations. Initial and ongoing SA is critical to decision
making (Sarna 2002). Thus a decision-maker may make
the correct decision based upon their perception of the
situation, but if their situation assessment is incorrect then
this may negatively influence their decision (Crichton and
Flin 2002). When responding to a volcanic eruption, de-
veloping and maintaining this SA is important for both
volcanologists (in their assessment of available data and
future projections, information from other agencies, de-
mands upon their advice) and emergency managers and
decision makers (in their assessment and understanding
of information - including science advice, resources, de-
mands and future requirements and needs).
In reviews of the inter-organisational response of the
1995–1996 Ruapehu eruptions in NZ (Paton et al.
1998a, 1998b, 1999), several issues affected the SA of
both scientists and emergency managers. In particular,
“inter-organisational networking” was weak, with none
of the responding agencies (e.g. fire, police, civil defence,
social services, media, etc.) having an established or for-
malised inter-organisation network in place with GNS
Science before the event, even though GNS Science
acted as an information provider for 63% of the respond-
ing agencies. This resulted in organisations interacting
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ing to co-ordination and communication problems and
preventing their using crucial information to build and
maintain SA, and thus impacting both emergency man-
agement and volcanological decision-making processes
and outcomes. This was compounded by issues such as
the “lack of clear responsibility for co-ordination” across
responding agencies (reported by 45% of participating
agencies), “inadequate communication with other agen-
cies” (37%), and “inadequate co-ordination of response”
(32%). These are all indicators of “team breakdown”, in-
adequately defined and co-ordinated roles, and poor
communication (Paton et al. 1998a, 1999). The develop-
ment of effective inter-organisational crisis communica-
tion requires (Paton et al. 1998a) “information needs
[that] are anticipated and defined, that networks with in-
formation providers and recipients are organised, and
[that] crisis communication systems capable of provid-
ing, accessing, collating, interpreting and disseminating
information are established. … [and] shared terminology
and systems” (p. 8).
The development of VSAGs and the associated Terms
of Reference within NZ over the last two decades will
have helped to build shared mental models of the re-
sponse environment across organisations. VSAG devel-
opment has included the identification of protocols for
communication and networking with emergency man-
agement and key response organisations, and specifying
relationship building activities to be undertaken within
these groups. These activities have improved communica-
tion and information flow during a volcanic crisis and thus
the shared situational awareness in that crisis. Comparison
of Figures 1 and 2 illustrates the change and improvement
in information flow processes between Ruapehu in 95–96
(Figure 1) and Ruaumoko in 2008 (Figure 2).
The rarity of large scale eruptions makes it important
to capitalize on the learning opportunities events, exer-
cises, and reviews provide for developing situational
awareness and for facilitating the ability of scientific ad-
visors to develop shared mental models of their and
others role in response management. This feeds into
training needs analysis and the development of the situ-
ational awareness competencies and decision support
systems required to sustain effective situational aware-
ness in complex, rapidly evolving and dynamic volcanic
crises. It can also inform the development of the shared
situational awareness required if all team members make
their respective contributions to a shared task or goal.
That is, to develop shared mental models of presenting
problems and response options, particularly when deci-
sion inputs come from different professions and/or from
participants who are spread over a large geographical
area. Facilitating the latter introduces a need for distrib-
uted decision making, discussed next.3.3 Shared mental models
The scale and complexity of volcanic crisis response re-
sults in decision-making involving people who differ in
their profession, expertise, functions, roles and geo-
graphical location. This more integrative decision style is
called distributed decision making (Rogalski & Samurcay
1993, as cited in Paton & Jackson 2002). As discussed in
Section 3.1, an individual’s mental model impacts indi-
vidual decision making, as it is their representation of
the wider system and processes, including inter-agency
relationships, needs and demands, and an individual’s
role within a crisis. Thus, for effective distributed deci-
sion making, individuals require a good shared mental
model of the response environment in time and space,
which incorporates how their expertise contributes to
different parts of the same plan, and their understanding
of each other’s knowledge, skills, roles, anticipated be-
haviour or needs (Flin 1996; Marks et al. 2002; Paton
and Jackson 2002; Schaafstal et al. 2001). By building a
shared mental model, team members can develop an ac-
curate expectation of the performance of their team
members and themselves, leading to effective coordin-
ation without overt strategizing (Blickensderfer et al.
1998; Cannon-Bowers et al. 1998; Lipshitz et al. 2001;
Salas et al. 1994).
The collection of GNS Science information by re-
sponse agencies in an ad-hoc basis (Paton et al. 1998a &
Paton et al. 1999) during the 1995–1996 Ruapehu erup-
tions describes a process where information was being
provided by explicit requests only. In such cases, the in-
formation provided often also needed to be adapted and
translated to meet decision needs. However, research in
the decision making community has identified that ef-
fective teams move from the sharing of information by
explicit request towards an approach that adopts implicit
supply, where members provide not only good informa-
tion, but unprompted information that is tailored in
terms of content and format due to their understanding
of the needs of the recipient (Lipshitz et al. 2001;
Kowalski-Trakofler et al. 2003; Paton and Flin 1999).
Implicit communication also facilitates the mainten-
ance of situational awareness during periods of dynamic
information, as it allows decision makers to focus on task
management. For this kind of team functioning to be suc-
cessful in complex, time pressured situations, (Wilson
et al. 2007, as cited in Owen et al. 2013, p. 5) identified
that it required the following characteristics:
 Effective communication consisting of accurate and
timely information exchange, correct phraseology
and closed-loop communication techniques;
 Coordinated behaviour based on shared knowledge,
performance monitoring, back-up and adaptability;
and
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cohesion.
However, as highlighted by Owen et al. (2013), p. 6 for the
multi-team, multi-organisational, coordination characteristic
of large-scale complex emergency management events,
the challenge is not just to build an effective team, but “to
understand how a team coordinates within teams” and
how understanding may be “shared between teams”. When
we consider a multi-agency VSAG, the responding scien-
tists can be considered as but one team within the com-
plex multi-team response. Owen et al. (2013) identify four
distinct stages for effective and adaptive team functio-
ning for an inter-team inter-organisational response,
including: 1) situation assessment, 2) plan formulation,
3) plan execution, and 4) team learning. These, and the
indicators typically used to identify whether these acti-
vities are occurring, are depicted in Table 1.
A significant challenge here derives from a need to co-
ordinate the inputs of different agencies and experts to
assist the holistic management of complex hazard conse-
quences. For example, public health specialists possess
expertise concerning the specific effects of ash and gas
on health. However, to mount an effective response,
their input, as members of an ‘emergent’ team, must be
integrated with input from, for example, volcanologists,
emergency managers, social welfare, and transport agen-
cies, to facilitate understanding of the ‘whole’ problem,Table 1 Framework for inter-team inter-organisational coordi
Phase Within teams Between
Situation assessment Information gathering, individuals
scan the environment to identify cues
Boundary
Individual and Team Situation Awareness Distributed
Awareness
Sense-making Organisati
Plan formulation Meaning making Shared be





Team trust and cohesion Social net
Plan execution Communication Relational









(post respprioritise issues, and to identify where is safe for people
to be evacuated to, etc. This example illustrates how, for
example, public health specialists and volcanologists
need to bring their professional team mental model to
bear on identifying their specific contribution, but also
develop a superordinate (overarching) mental model that
integrates all areas of expertise. A significant challenge
arises because scientists, and indeed all stakeholders,
need to switch between a) being autonomous actors, and
b) being multi-disciplinary team members, depending on
the task being undertaken (Janssen et al. 2010).
Fundamentally, in a volcanic crisis response setting,
the science advisors’ and VSAGs’ role is to provide infor-
mation to facilitate the response agencies understanding
of the hazard issues, priorities, the wider context, im-
pacts, and potential future outcomes, and thus build
their situational awareness to aid their decision-making
process. However, as stated by Doyle & Johnston (2011),
it is not just a case of providing the emergency managers
with all available science information, but about under-
standing their needs to meet their information require-
ments. Simply providing as much advice as possible may
actually hinder the decision process, due to cognitive
overload and an overuse of these available resources
(Crichton and Flin 2002; Omodei et al. 2005; Quarantelli
1997). To contribute in this way, scientific advisors need
to develop a shared mental model with their emergency
manager counterparts both prior to an event (to developnation (Owen et al. 2013)
teams Anchor points
spanning Within teams: incident briefings; handovers
Situation
Social networks
Between teams: Emergency Management
Team (EMT) briefings; situation reports;
emergency services liaison officers
onal culture Information flows through texting, emails,
data retrieval




cognition Command and Control (C2) teleconferences;
EMT meetings
works Regional and state level team membership
coordination Observations of teamwork
storical activity theory Temporal and cultural-structural boundary points
spanning C2 teleconferences; EMT meetings
f organisational
nd contradictions
Within teams: immediate debriefs
onal learning
onse)
Between teams: multi-agency after action
reviews; development of knowledge networks.
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mental model encompasses the overlapping elements of
each team member’s SA and represents the inter-team
co-ordination (Endsley 1994), allowing an effective co-
ordination amongst team members without the need for
extensive overt strategizing (Salas et al. 1994; see review
in Doyle & Johnston 2011).
For science response it is thus vital that scientists de-
velop this shared mental model within the VSAG, and in
the wider multi-agency response, to facilitate their ability
to implicitly provide the science information required by
the main decision makers at critical periods (see also
Doyle & Johnston 2011). However, when dealing with
the uncertainty implicit in volcanic crises the effectiveness
of this information sharing relationship is influenced by
the degree of trust that exists, or that needs to be devel-
oped in situ, between key players. This is particularly im-
portant given the rarity of opportunities for functional
organizational interaction before a crisis occurs.
3.4 Trust
Trust plays a pivotal role in developing sustainable,
functional relationships when members of diverse orga-
nizations need to collaborate to access, share and use in-
formation for decision making in response environments
characterized by uncertainty (Siegrist and Cvetkovich
2000). Without trust, teams focus on task demands, not
teamwork, reducing their effectiveness in tackling emer-
gent crisis response needs (Pollock et al. 2003).
Inter-agency trust develops through collaboration. Since
volcanologists and emergency managers rarely work together
under normal circumstances, trust among agencies may
be lacking (Dirks and Ferrin 2001). Since representatives
of scientific and EM agencies typically meet and interact
for the first time during a crisis, agency representatives are
denied the luxury of building trusting relationships over
time. Trust must be developed via other mechanisms.
One approach capitalizes on the concept of swift trust
(e.g. Meyerson et al. 1996).
Swift trust can be developed in temporary (EOC) orga-
nizations if certain conditions are met. Meyerson et al.
(1996) argue that, firstly, swift trust is less about the inter-
personal relationship factors that underpin traditional
forms of trust (built up over a prolonged period of time),
and more about encouraging a focus on goal achievement
by facilitating the ability of participants to understand
their respective contributions to a superordinate (over-
arching) team managing complex evolving eruption con-
sequences. Secondly, swift trust is more likely to arise
when drawing upon a small pool of representatives who
have an increased chance of future interaction, with this
condition creating a social setting that can foster quicker
trust building between parties. Finally, swift trust avoids
personal disclosure in favour of a reliance and focus onkey tasks that relate to the features of the setting (i.e., the
need to integrate diverse organizational and professional
perspectives to tackle specific response issues as a mem-
ber of a superordinate team). If all members of the super-
ordinate EOC organization, incorporating the VSAG,
adopt these roles they are more likely to be able to develop
trusting relationships that facilitate effective information ex-
change and utilization in high risk, evolving crisis events.
Evidence of swift trust first emerged from Goodman
and Goodman’s (1976) observation that some temporary
groups did not have a history of trust, but developed
“swift trust” through task related interaction. Evidence
for the effective role that swift trust can play in multi-
agency and distributed management systems comes from
research into global virtual teams that exemplify tempor-
ary organizations; and the requirement for collaborative
team management further supports its utility (Coppola
et al. 2004; Crisp & Jarvenpaa 2013; Robert et al. 2009;
White et al. 2008). The concept of swift trust has only re-
cently been tested in multi-agency natural hazard crisis re-
sponse contexts (Curnin et al. 2015). This, as well as
evidence for its effectiveness in military contexts which in-
volve the collaborative response to emergent, low-time/
high-risk demands over time (Ben-Shalom et al. 2005;
Hyllengren et al. 2011; Lester & Vogelgesang 2012) sug-
gests it should be included in future volcanic crisis re-
sponse protocols. Swift trust research in military contexts
also highlighted the importance of selecting team mem-
bers with sufficient status to be ‘heard’ in a multi-agency
team context (Curnin et al. 2015).
4 Activities to improve future response capability
In the above discussion, we outlined that effective indi-
vidual and team response to a crisis, such as a volcanic
eruption or unrest period, is characterised by good situ-
ational awareness, strong inter-organisational networks,
effective shared mental models, and high trust between
responding organisations and individuals. To achieve
this, and develop a common understanding of each other’s
roles, dependencies, and information needs, and the
over-all response environment, it is important to under-
take multi-organisational and multi-disciplinary planning
activities, and collaborative exercises and simulations
with all team members and advisors, to help in the devel-
opment of similar mental models of the task (see review
in Paton & Jackson 2002; Doyle & Johnston 2011). Such
a comprehensive suite of training and relationship build-
ing activities prior to an event, and detailed analysis of
event and exercise response, can facilitate future re-
sponse capability and identify areas for improvement.
This is particularly important given the rarity of volcanic
and other hazard events, and thus a lack of opportunity
for real world experience.
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training should be considered as a sequence or series of
developmental experiences that are carried out across a
series of different environments, to build “knowledge
and skills in an appropriate sequence across skill levels,
content and target levels”. Ideally this training and exer-
cising needs to develop both individual and team situ-
ational awareness (SA) and explore how and when each
is appropriate for response, within evolving, dynamic re-
sponse environments. Team SA can be developed in
post-event and post-exercise reviews that include identi-
fying inter-agency relationship issues as opportunities
for development (and not as problems). Through the
analysis of past events, lessons for successful communica-
tion, advice provisions and distributed decision-making
can also be learnt. However, these training activities need
not necessarily develop shared mental models and the
capacity for true levels of collaborative management etc.
Agencies can also use them to update, write, and prepare
plans, identify potential or existing issues with the re-
sponse, logistical, and communication plans; while also
testing such processes, systems, and communications.
Adopting a suite of training activities increases opportun-
ities for developing an understanding of the technical is-
sues involved and the multi-agency context in which they
occur (Borodzicz & van Haperen 2002).
Several training methods have been identified that can
enhance naturalistic decision-making (e.g. Cannon-Bowers
& Bell 1997), enhance decision skills (e.g. Pliske et al.
2001), train effective teams (e.g., Salas et al. 1997b), and
develop effective critical incident and team based simula-
tions (e.g. Crego & Spinks 1997; see review in Flin 1996,
chap. 6), all of which are relevant for volcanologists and
VSAGs. These include cross training, positional rotation,
scenario planning, collaborative exercises and simulations,
shared exercise writing tasks, and ‘train the trainer’ type
tasks; in addition to workshops, seminars, and specific
knowledge sharing activities.
We briefly discuss below two methods in particular:
cross-training and scenario planning, as we feel that they
are particularly suitable for volcanic response environ-
ments. Exercises, and the application of them to science
response, are discussed in detail in Section 5, including an
evaluation of the lessons learnt from Exercise Ruaumoko
in the context of the key competencies discussed in
Section 3. It is important to highlight that for all
these, it is not just knowledge and skill development that
is addressed through these activities; they also address
“how the disaster context influences performance and
well-being” (Paton et al. 2000, p. 176). In addition, each of
the training activities can be carried out at the many levels
of a response, for teams within an agency, for the entire
organisation, across multiple organisations, and for the full
multi-organisation response.4.1 Cross training
Cross training enhances the awareness and knowledge
that each team member has of their fellow team mem-
bers’ tasks, duties and responsibilities and facilitates the
holistic (shared mental model) understanding of team
functioning and the respective, interdependent role of a
given agency within the team (Marks et al. 2002; Schaafstal
et al. 2001; Volpe et al. 1996). This is termed their interpo-
sitional knowledge (IPK). Volpe et al. (1996) reason that
IPK allows team members to “anticipate the task needs
of fellow team members”, leading to more effective team
performance and enhanced coordination with a minimal
communication requirement, important when task loads
are high and individuals are too busy attending to these to
be able to make explicit information requests. In the ab-
sence of IPK, there exists interpositional uncertainty which
can hamper team performance (Blickensderfer et al. 1998).
Cross training is “an important determinant of effective
teamwork process, communication, and performance”
(Volpe et al. 1996, p. 12). Teammates who develop inter-
positional knowledge through cross-training: 1) interacted
more effectively with each other, 2) used more efficient
communication strategies, and 3) volunteered information
more often (Blickensderfer et al. 1998). It facilitated these
outcomes by “encouraging members to understand the
activities of those around them” (Blickensderfer et al.
1998), to better anticipate their needs and assist those in
need of help (see Table 2 and Schaafstal et al. 2001;
Marks et al. 2002). Furthermore, cross-training can foster
a sense of a shared “common bond” (Greenbaum 1979,
as cited in Blickensderfer et al. 1998) amongst team
members and support the establishment of morale, cohe-
sion and confidence.
Cross-training encompasses three methods that be-
come progressively more detailed and involved, and thus
more effective for improving shared mental models, un-
derstanding of complementary roles, and enhancing col-
laboration (Blickensderfer et al. 1998; Marks et al. 2002).
These are: 1) positional clarification, a form of awareness
training (e.g., by discussion, lecture, demonstration or dis-
semination of information) where specific information is
provided about other roles and responsibilities in the team
(e.g., working together in an EOC, or in a science response
team, for example); 2) positional modelling, a training pro-
cedure in which the duties of each team member are dis-
cussed and observed via behaviour observation (e.g.,
offering potential EOC participants some actual practice
in the other positions: a volcanologist could be given the
opportunity to play the role of, for example an intelligence
or logistics officer in an EOC context); and 3) positional
rotation, which involves training within the exercise con-
text where all team members spend significant periods of
time performing other team members’ jobs and roles, pro-
viding a working knowledge of each member’s specific
Table 2 Lessons learned from studies on cross-training teams (Blickensderfer et al. 1998)
1 Cross-trained teams are better able to anticipate each other’s needs (Volpe et al. 1996)
2 Cross- training fosters inter-positional knowledge (Cannon-Bowers et al. 1998)
3 Cross-training should be used in combination with team process training to provide maximum benefit
4 Length of cross-training intervention is not necessarily related to value of the intervention
5 Cross-training interventions should be designed on the basis of the interdependency requirements of the task, i.e. teams with high interdependencies
be given positional rotation, whereas teams with few interdependency requirements may need only basic knowledge of team structure, through
positional clarification
6 A number of guidelines regarding the training objectives and content can be based on the cross-training research. From these, cross-training
should do the following (adapted from Salas et al. 1997a, Blickensderfer et al. 1998):
i. Provide team members with an understanding of how other team members operate, why they operate as they do, and the manner in which
they are dependent on teammates for information and input;
ii. Provide team members with exposure to the roles, responsibilities, tasks, information needs, and contingencies of their teammates’ tasks;
iii. Provide team members with practice on the roles and tasks of teammates, highlighting the interdependencies of the positions as
requested; and
iv. Provide feedback during cross-training exercises that allows teams members to formulate accurate explanations for their teammates’
behaviour and reasonable expectations for their teammates’ resource needs.
v. To determine the specific content of cross-training, a team task analysis should be conducted. This will help to identify interdependencies
in the task and to identify what inter-positional knowledge is necessary to help teammates coordinate
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perspectives of the overall situation. The chosen cross
training method amongst these three approaches should
correspond to the realistic level of interdependence of the
team (Ford and Schmidt 2000).
4.2 Scenario planning
Scenario planning is a technique that creates multiple
scenarios of “different futures” in ways that accommo-
date the perspectives of multiple agencies (i.e., to de-
velop response scenarios that more accurately reconcile
the needs, goal and expectations of diverse agencies;
Bloom and Menefee 2014; Moats et al. 2008; Paton
2014). At a fundamental level, scenario planning allows
an “organisation to examine several options or risks that
might have been overlooked in a plan that was con-
structed around a single environment. The process
forces managers to think about the unthinkable and to
even plan for it” (Bloom and Menefee 2014). Through
this process, the goal is to outline possible futures that
are “credible and yet uncertain” (Keough and Shanahan
2008). Various alternative steps to the scenario planning
process are outlined in Table 3.
Scenario planning enables the integration and aware-
ness of the various social, political, economic, cultural,
and other environmental forces that underpin the histor-
ies and expectations different agencies bring to the re-
sponse management environment. It also provides an
opportunity to ‘rehearse the future’, promoting adaption
versus reaction, and providing a safe space through
which various points of view and new or unique ideas
from within the team can be shared without the fear of
being prejudged or automatically dismissed (Bloom andMenefee 2014). Through this process, the volcanic crisis
management team can also enhance their understanding
of the wider response process, the key issue and decision
thresholds, and trigger points; thus facilitating their col-
lective ability to integrate their various perspectives and
develop a bigger picture of the response than would
arise if this was based on an individual role or stake-
holder working separately. This can enhance shared situ-
ational awareness of the issues and process amongst the
participating team. Scenario planning can be conducted
at the sub-agency level (e.g. a monitoring team at a vol-
cano observatory planning the response and deployment
of personnel and instrumentation to facilitate effective
monitoring during outcomes of an unrest scenario), at
the agency level (e.g. a government science agency and
university identifying how they could share resources and
support each other during a response) and the multi-
agency level (e.g. the VSAG considering potential eruption
and response scenarios with the local CDEM group). In
particular, for scientists, it provides an opportunity to
work alongside emergency managers to identify science
information needs and impacts of that information on
decision outcomes, thresholds and trigger points.5 Exploring exercises in detail
In the field of emergency management, exercises to test
response and procedures, and to train personnel com-
monly fall into one of the five categories listed in Table 4,
from the small scale in-house orientation exercise to a
full-scale multi-agency exercise conducted at the local,
national and international level. These different types of
exercises may then each be conducted at the different
Table 3 The generic scenario planning model of Keough and Shanahan (2008), and an example of a scenario building
model for step 3 given by Schwartz’ 8-step approach (Schwartz 1996; as cited in Keough and Shanahan 2008)
Generic scenario planning model Schwartz’ 8-step scenario building model
1 Engage in scenario planning 1 Identify focal issue or decision
2 Compose the team 2 Identify key factors in the local environment which influence the decision
3 Scenario Building 3 Identify driving forces that influence key factors in the local environment
4 Decision process 4 Rank by importance and uncertainty
5 Increased performance 5 Select scenario logics
6 Flesh out scenarios
7 Consider implications
8 Selection of leading indicators and signposts
Alternatives to this scenario building model, with additional steps: a) research, b) identifying major stakeholders, and c) communication, can also be found in
Wilson and Ralston (2006) and Moats et al. (2008). The 18 step approach of Wilson & Ralston provides a clear road map through four phases of scenario planning,
including a) getting started, b) laying the environmental analysis foundation, c) creating the scenarios, and d) moving from scenarios to a decision. Through these
various approaches, the current mental models of participants and their assumptions can be identified and improved upon.
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are (MCDEM 2009a):
 Tier 1: Local exercise (individual organisation)
 Tier 2: Group exercise (within CDEM group)
 Tier 3: Inter-Group exercise (across CDEM Groups,
may include MCDEM)
 Tier 4: National exercise (New Zealand or part
thereof, including central government).
In NZ, MCDEM runs a voluntary participation Na-
tional CDEM Exercise Programme which exercises at all
levels of the CDEM structure listed above, where each
tier exercise is informed by a “consistent regime of plan-
ning, observation, evaluation, feedback and continuous
improvement” (MCDEM 2009a, p. 11). These are run
within a 10 year schedule of exercise programming, with
Tier 3 exercises every second year and Tier 4 exercises
in the intervening years (MCDEM 2009b). Individual or-
ganisations can participate in each of these exercises to
the scale and scope they desire (e.g., ranging from a
small scale in-house orientation exercise through to a
multi-agency full scale response, Table 4).
Examples of recent Tier 4 exercises in NZ include the
CDEM Exercise Tangaroa conducted in NZ to test the
national response to a national tsunami warning in 2010
(MCDEM website 2014a; Coetzee & Gale 2010), and Ex-
ercise Ruaumoko which tested an all of nation response
to a volcanic eruption in the Auckland Volcanic Field
(discused earlier, MCDEM 2008). An example of Tier 3
is the planned exercise Te Matau-a-Maui functional
earthquake exercise to be run by the Hawke’s Bay
CDEM group to exercise the multi-organisational cross
CDEM response to a MMVII scale earthquake in the re-
gion. An example of a Tier 2 is the (regional) Bay of
Plenty CDEM group exercise of a severe weather eventinvolving a storm surge leading to flooding and signifi-
cant infrastructure damage in the region with a goal to
exercise lifeline utility business continuity plans.
A full list of previous and planned exercises within the
NZ CDEM sector can be found on the MCDEM website
(2014b). These Tier 2, 3 and 4 exercises involve a wide
range of co-ordination, collaboration, and considerable
inter-organisational planning depending on the Tier
level. In comparison, Tier 1 exercises involve just the in-
dividual organisation, such as a university exercising its
response to a critical incident on campus (such as an
earthquake or armed intruder). Similar tier structures
are used by other organisations both nationally and
internationally (e.g. FEMA’s National Exercise Program,
FEMA 2007; FEMA website 2014). For example, in NZ,
Maritime New Zealand - Nō te rere moana Aotearoa
(the Crown entity for Maritime safety, regulation, and
emergency response) prepared contingency plans and
runs exercises following three tiers depending on the
level of responsibility: Tier 1 - industry (ships and on-
shore/offshore oil transfer sites), Tier 2 – regional coun-
cils, and Tier 3 – Maritime New Zealand.
Further to these national government led exercise sched-
ules, there are a number of international collaboration
programs to exercise response across nations. For ex-
ample, Exercise Pacific Wave is run by the International
Tsunami Information Center every two years to practice
the sharing of information, warnings, advice, and re-
sources while practicing government led decision making
for a tsunami in the Pacific (UNESCO website 2014a).
Similar exercise schedules exist for the Indian Ocean and
Caribbean Sea, as well as the Mediterranean (UNESCO
website 2014b). These provide useful examples of multi-
agency international exercises, with a wide variety of orga-
nisations participating to various degrees (e.g. as watchers,
partial participants, or full exercise participants). For ex-
ample, 34 Pacific countries directly participated in
Table 4 The five types of emergency management exercises, as described by MCDEM (2009a)
What Details Example
Orientation exercise A ‘walk through’. It puts people in a place where they would
work during an event, or uses them as participants in a
demonstration of an activity. This type of exercise is used to
familiarise the players with the activity
Setting up a mock welfare centre, and walking staff
through how it is organised.
Drill exercise Players physically handle specific equipment or perform a
specific procedure. The exercise usually has a time frame
element and is used to test the procedures.
Activating an emergency operations centre or using
alternative communications (such as radios).
Tabletop or
Discussion exercise
Participants are presented with a problem that they are
required to discuss and formulate the appropriate response
or solution. Can be:
Participants discuss their response to a tsunami threat
to a particular area, where the only injects are Tsunami
Bulletins, Watches or Warnings from the Pacific Tsunami
Warning Centre in Hawaii, describing the nature of
the threat.• Facilitated: where the exercise controller actually facilitates
the discussion through a series of questions in a stress free,
relaxed environment, designed to identify gaps or problems
in procedures or resources
• Inject driven: where the personnel are provided a scenario
and prewritten exercise injects, to practice problem solving
and co-ordination of services – with or without time pressures
In both of these, there is no actual deployment or use
of equipment or resources.
Functional exercise Can also be called an operational or tactical exercise, it takes
place in an operational environment and requires participants
to actually perform the functions of their roles. A normally
complex response activity is simulated, which lacks only the
people “on the ground” to create a full-scale exercise.
A multi-agency response to extensive flooding, where
evacuation of a settlement is required. Messages and
injects are provided by exercise control and are
handled by the participants in the way described in
appropriate plans and procedures. Outcomes are
generated that would be expected in a real situation.
• Participants interact within a simulated environment through
an exercise control group who provide prewritten injects and
respond to questions and tasks developing out of the exercise.
• Functional exercises normally involve multi-agency
participation (real or simulated) and it can focus on one or
many geographical areas.
• This type of exercise is used to practice multiple emergency
functions e.g. direction and control, resource management
and communications.
Full-scale exercise Sometimes also called a ‘practical’ or ‘field’ exercise. These
include the movement or deployment of people and
resources to include physical response ‘on the ground’
to a simulated situation.
Deployment of a small team to a simulated car crash
or industrial rescue by a single agency, using real
rescue equipment.
• They can be ‘ground’ focused only or may include the
higher level response structures, and they can be simple
(single agency) or complex (multi agency).
Or, coordinated multi-agency response to a tsunami
warning involving actual evacuations and actors
portraying the public.
• These exercises are typically used to test all aspects of a
component of emergency management.
• Can be simple single agency, or complex multi-agency.
Similar definitions are provided by the US Department of Homeland Security, with further types including Seminars, Games and Drills (HSEEP 2007a; HSEEP 2007b).
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‘watched’ the exercise (i.e. received warning messages),
which simulated the response to a tsunami induced by a
M9.2 earthquake off northwest Japan (UNESCO website
2014c). The purpose of this exercise was to evaluate and
improve warning systems, and to improve the effective-
ness of ‘Member States’ in responding to a destructive tsu-
nami, including exercising of their operational lines of
communications, warning systems, emergency response
procedures and decision making, as well as to promote
emergency preparedness. Exercises such as these could in-
form future multi-national global exercises in thevolcanological community to enhance and inform best
practice and protocols for international collaboration and
response to an event that crosses country borders. This
could be led by an international organisation like the
International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry
of the Earth’s Interior (IAVCEI), to simulate and integrate
the full scale global volcanological response to a Black
Swanb volcanic event: such as a VEI 7 caldera eruption
and the associated ash cloud, or managing the impacts of
a fissure event like the 1783 Laki eruption.
The involvement of science advisors in these exercises
is vital for the development of shared understanding and
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decision makers, as discussed above. For example, the
Ruaumoko exercise in NZ (MCDEM 2008; Smith 2009;
Lindsay et al. 2010) involved science organisations (such
as GNS Science) from exercise inception and scenario
design, through to activation and response, and were
used as opportunities to practice response, explore sci-
ence advice, and try decision making tools relating to
evacuation. However, it is vital that the scientists fulfill-
ing the response role are rotated through the exercise, to
represent realistic shift rotation in a prolonged event,
and across exercises to ensure that as many potentially
responding scientists as possible have the opportunity to
practice these roles and build relationships with critical
decision makers. Further, as discussed in Section 3, this
rotation will enable performance management tech-
niques to be practiced and refined, such as role swap-
ping, shift rotation, rotation of the lead science agency
or individual, and the balance of time and resources ded-
icated to the ‘response role’ and the ‘day-to-day research
role’. These become increasingly important during long
duration responses providing resilience to the response
(against untoward events, as well as contingent demands),
while enabling a sharing of the load, management of com-
peting or conflicting demands (both professional and per-
sonal) and maintenance of a fresh perspective via fatigue
management.
Further, it is important that scientists, science agen-
cies, and science advisory groups also lead and develop
their own in-house and cross-science agency exercises to
develop competencies around the science response itself.Table 5 A sample of best practice guidelines available online
(all websites last accessed on 23 April 2014)
Who What & where
New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence
and Emergency Management
CDEM Exercises, Director’s Guid
http://www.civildefence.govt.nz
US Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Exercise and
effective exercise writing at: htt
US Department of Homeland Security,
Federal Emergency Management Institute
FEMA’s National preparedness d
courses across the range of Em
includes the unit IS-139 on ‘Exe
http://training.fema.gov/emiwe
See also the Ready.gov resourc
UK Cabinet Office & National Security
and Intelligence
Emergency planning and Prepa
https://www.gov.uk/emergency
including ‘The exercise planner
planners-guide
National Directorate for Fire and
Emergency Management, Ireland
A framework for major emerge





Documents/ManagingExercisesThus we now review existing best practice guidelines for
writing and evaluating such exercises.
5.1 Writing and evaluating exercises: practice guidelines
There are many guidelines existing in the emergency
management and government literature that provide dis-
tinct steps to effectively write exercises (see Table 5).
These all recommend the adoption of an exercise cycle,
an example of which goes through the steps: 1) analysing
the needs and outcomes desired for the exercise, which
may be in line with process or performance improve-
ment plans (this step may include a ‘foundation’ step
assessing the status quo); 2) design and development of
the exercise; 3) conducting the exercise; and 4) evaluat-
ing the exercise (see Figure 3).
It is important that exercises do not just consider an
event building up to a crescendo (e.g. the unrest period
leading up to an eruption), but also consider non-events
(the stalled eruption), response and recovery periods after
an eruption (e.g. the period after a ‘blue sky’ eruption), or
the issues of having a second volcanic crisis occurring
alongside the focus volcano (e.g. in 2012 during the Te
Maari unrest period in NZ, White Island also increased in
activity requiring alert level changes). The volcanic events
in NZ in 2012 provide a useful exercise scenario to exam-
ine the distribution of resources and personnel across two
concurrent crises, and to identify more overt strategies for
stress and fatigue management.
Exercises and simulations afford opportunities for
agency representatives to develop, practice and review
technical, management and team skills under realisticfor the design, writing and implementation of exercises
elines for Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups [DGL 010/09]
/assets/Uploads/publications/dgl-10-09-cdem-exercises.pdf
Evaluation Program has a range of documents available outlining
ps://www.llis.dhs.gov/HSEEP
irectorate on National Training and Education runs a series of online
ergency Management at http://www.training.fema.gov/, which
rcise Design’ which contains a range of useful resources.
b/is/is139lst.asp
es at: http://www.ready.gov/business/testing/exercises
redness: exercises and training
-planning-and-preparedness-exercises-and-training
s guide’: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-exercise-





Figure 3 The cycle of continuous improvement and the
exercise management model, after the Australian Emergency
Management Institute (AEMI 2012) and the Ministry of Civil
Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM 2009a). Variants
of this cycle are provided by each of the guidelines described
in Table 5.
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pectations, and provide opportunities for developing cre-
ative problem solving competencies (within and between
teams). They also provide opportunities to practice deal-
ing with high pressure situations in a safe and supportive
environment, increase awareness of stress reactions, and
to rehearse strategies to minimize negative reactions
(Flin 1996). However, many exercises fail to mirror the
complexity of disaster response environments (Paton
and Auld 2006).
There is a tendency sometimes to write these exercises
like a ‘play’, providing too much structure and tailored
or specific information. However, a truly challenging ex-
ercise, that provides the greatest opportunities for learn-
ing, should provide incomplete information, conflicting
aspects, gaps in the situation description, ambiguous in-
formation, and unknowns; all creating an environment
where participants are asking questions, not just finding
solutions (Paton and Auld 2006). For example, a monitor-
ing team exercise could provide a situation in-exercise
where one or many data feeds abruptly end. This provides
participants a situation to address whether a machine or
data relay has broken, or whether a significant event has
occurred, allowing them to exercise the situation of uncer-
tainty and potential decision and action strategies. Exer-
cises should be designed in ways that allow individuals
and teams to progressively push their boundaries and de-
velop progressively more sophisticated competencies and
relationships (Paton and Jackson 2002). Only through ex-
posure to exercises that challenge assumptions and allowpersonnel to confront novel events can preparation en-
hance response effectiveness for eruption events whose
complexity will exceed even the most extreme simulation
(Paton and Auld 2006).
Thus these exercises should aim to reproduce reality as
closely as possible, so decision makers and experts can ex-
perience the needs and realities of the advisory process in
turbulent conditions (Borodzicz and van Haperen 2002;
Rosenthal and’t Hart 1989). However, this alleged realism
can also be a danger as personnel may believe at the end of
an exercise that they know what will happen in a real crisis
(Borodzicz and van Haperen 2002). Evaluation of exercises
and events must be carefully conducted to minimise the
risk of creating an optimistic bias that overestimates future
response preparedness and capability, particularly if a real
event has not constituted a major test of the response sys-
tem (Paton et al. 1998a). The development of an inter-
agency exercise database would greatly assist this process.
Guidelines for evaluation and debriefings can be found
in the emergency management literature (see Table 5
and Sinclair et al. 2012a; Sinclair et al. 2012b). However,
these tend to focus on Key Performance Indicators
(KPIs) and specific tasks, response plans, and communi-
cation process or outcomes and content evaluation. To
ensure these exercise experiences truly enhance team re-
sponse and development of a common understanding
across the team, it is important to also consider team
and group learning (Owen et al. 2013), as well as the as-
sessment of individual learning processes such as the
progression from unconscious incompetence (‘I don’t
know what I don’t know’) through to unconscious com-
petence (‘my skill has become second nature’) (Conger
and Mullen 1981; Morell et al. 2002; Thomson et al.
2006). That is, an effective exercise is one that throws
up several unanticipated issues (e.g., regarding informa-
tion management, decision making, team functioning
etc.) that can inform future training needs analyses and
training and exercise design. Thus, exercising and
scenario-based training should be regarded as an itera-
tive process, where the debrief and evaluation is a vital
part of that process to enhance the knowledge and skills
of the participants, and to help them change their world
view and individual paradigms, whilst also minimizing
weaknesses caused by problems with exercise fidelity,
such as a poor scenario or lack of reality (see review in
Moats et al. 2008).
5.2 Exercise Ruaumoko: the importance of exercises and
evaluation
Evidence for the benefits of exercises can be gleaned from
Exercise Ruaumoko; benefits identified included oppor-
tunities to test the Auckland Volcanic Scientific Advisory
Group (AVSAG, McDowell 2008). It was a valuable learn-
ing experience for all concerned, illustrating the criticality
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ability of key infrastructure elements (MCDEM 2008, p.
7). Further, the process of preparing for the Exercise
motivated the formalisation of the AVSAG structure
(McDowell 2008) and helped to improve the understand-
ing and performance of “individual elements” within a
major CDEM operation (MCDEM 2008). However, one of
the greatest benefits of the exercise was that it highlighted
the need for considerable work “to co-ordinate the various
elements” of the inter-agency response into a “cohesive
[future] response” (MCDEM 2008). This exercise thus
allowed responding agencies to identify response, network
and communication issues that need to be modified for ef-
fective response and the importance of testing assump-
tions under realistic crisis conditions, such as high stress,
short time, and low resource conditions with competing
demands, to demonstrate faults or potential faults in the
system. We thus now further discuss Exercise Ruaumoko
in detail to provide an example of an exercise structure
and to illustrate the benefits of effective evaluation.
Exercise Ruaumoko was a MCDEM led exercise, with
over 1,500 participants from approximately 125 partici-
pating organisations (MCDEM 2008, p. 8). It was the
second in a series of ongoing “All of Nation” exercises
led by MCDEM (MCDEM website 2014c). Exercise
Ruaumoko also provided a focus to develop and formal-
ise the AVSAG structure (which was co-ordinated and
arranged by Auckland CDEM), while also implementing
Terms of Reference, and arranging formal contract
agreements for the participating scientists (Cronin
2008); and to test such processes within a scenario. The
three core objectives of the exercise were to: 1) under-
stand, develop, and practice the respective roles and re-
sponsibilities of local, regional, and national agencies in
response to the exercise scenario (McDowell 2008, p. 7;
MCDEM 2008, p. 5); 2) embed the planning arrange-
ments in standard processes for all participating agen-
cies; and 3) confirm the connections between local,
regional, national and international agencies. In addition,
it enabled staff at the key levels to “practice and develop
planning and the management of response activities
using the connections and procedures that are in place”,
and also practice the roles, responsibilities and procedures
that are included in the National CDEM plan (MCDEM
2008, p. 55). The key sub-objectives of the exercise most
relevant to science advice included the examination and
testing of the coordination of science aspects and the
management of public information and education. While
Exercise Ruaumoko was primarily written and co-ordinated
by MCDEM with Civil Defence objectives, it still provides a
useful example for volcanologists of a large scale volcan-
ology exercise, and the monitoring information and science
response parts could be “re-exercised” or used as inspir-
ation for a smaller scale science led exercise.One of the unique aspects of Exercise Ruaumoko was
its timeline, which involved periods of “unfelt earth-
quakes” in November 2007 and then again between 3rd
to 7th March 2008. This was followed by a week of in-
creased activity and full exercise play from Monday 10th
to Friday 14th March, 2008 (MCDEM 2008, p. 11; see
Table 6). Throughout this scenario, GNS Science and its
duty volcanology team received raw geophysical data
such that they could directly exercise their analysis and
interpretation processes, participate within the AVSAG
response, practice their own decision making, and pro-
duce Science Alert Bulletins, which in turn formed in-
jects for the rest of the exercise participants (CDEM and
other response and welfare agencies). The scenario fo-
cused on the lead-in to a volcanic eruption, stopping
shortly after the eruption started (MCDEM 2008, p. 8),
thus the concept of the exercise was to provide for pre-
emergency planning rather than operating in the trad-
itional post-event response only mode often typified of
exercises (MCDEM 2008, p. 9). Detailed information re-
garding the exercise management and planning process,
which started in 2006, can be found in MCDEM (2008).
Great lengths were undertaken to ensure this exercise
was realistic, with a scientist “acting the volcano” and
providing monitoring data injects, and the eventual out-
come (including vent location in this monogenetic field)
being kept secret from all participants. The wide number
of participating organisations added realism in terms
of inter-organisational communication and networks
(Section 3). However, realism in this exercise was reduced
by AVSAG and the GeoNet “actors” not being expected to
participate in the exercise outside normal business hours.
On the night of Thursday 13th, this became a particular
issue as the emergency managers and decision makers
continued to conduct exercise “play” throughout the night
in the absence of the science advisors.
Cognisant of this issue, there are still many lessons
that were identified from exercise reviews that have dir-
ect implications for the improvement of future response.
Exercise evaluations we consider here include: the in-
house GNS Science review of the AVSAG and GeoNet
process, a NZ volcanologist who acted as an observer to
the exercise including all AVSAG meetings and confer-
ence calls (Cronin 2008), MCDEM’s all of exercise evalu-
ation (MCDEM 2008, and Table 7), and Auckland’s’
Civil Defence Emergency Management Group evaluation
report (McDowell 2008). Several key issues were ob-
served and lessons identified which we now discuss in
reference to our understanding from Section 3 of situ-
ational awareness, mental models, trust and decision
making for effective response, as follows:
 The AVSAG was constructed of a tri-partite
sub-group system (Volcano Monitoring, Volcanology
Table 6 The scenario timeline of Exercise Ruaumoko (MCDEM 2008)
November 2007 • Initial phase of the exercise: initial earthquakes characterised as ‘deep long period earthquakes’ and suspected by
seismologists participating in the exercise to be of volcanic origin. Due to the rarity of such earthquakes in the
Auckland region, the GNS Science/GeoNet exercise participants raised the Scientific Alert Level for the Auckland
Volcanic Field to 1 (“Initial signs of volcanic unrest”)*.
• Fourty eight hours later this seismic activity appeared to stop, with no observable shallowing of earthquake depths.
The exercise scientists determined after a week of quiescence that “if there had been an intrusion of magma, it had
likely stopped or ‘failed’ at a depth of 40–50 km” (MCDEM, p. 11).
• Scientific Alert level reduced to 0 (“Usual dormant or quiescent state”) on 16th November
March 2008 • Second phase of the exercise: seismicity resumed and became sustained causing concern for the ‘exercising’
authorities and Auckland communities, as the seismic source progressively shallowed, indicating that a volcanic
eruption may occur. However, the geographic distribution of earthquake epicentres indicated a few possible locations
for such an eruption in the monogenetic field.
3rd March • Scientific Alert Level raised to Level 1 (“Initial signs of volcanic unrest”)
8th March • Scientific Alert Level raised to Level 2 (“Confirmation of volcano unrest”)
9th -12th March • Earthquakes started to be ‘felt’ across the Auckland region as the seismic source reached 20–25 km depth, and by 20 km
more than 50 were being recorded a day.
12th March • At 10–15 km depth the events exceeded 100 per day, and by 12th March the earthquakes started to cluster in one region
(Mt Roskill-Hillsborough to Mangere), such that ACDEM started to draw up evacuation maps.
12th March • Scientific Alert Level raised to Level 3 (“Real possibility of Hazardous eruptions”)
13th March • Clustering of earthquakes refined further (Mangere Inlet) with 300 events ‘recorded’ in a 24 hour period with depths
of 5 km and many being of Mercalli 4.5 and ‘felt’ by residents.
14th March • By the morning of Friday 14th March, earthquake merged into tremor, increasing in strength throughout the morning
with ground cracking and slumping observed around the Kiwi Esplanade and Mangere Bridge, and by 1.50 pm a small
phreatomagmatic eruption had begun.
14th March • Scientific Alert Level raised to Level 4 (“Hazardous local eruption in progress”)
• End Of Exercise
*Note the NZ volcanic alert level system and associated descriptions was changed in June 2014 (see GeoNet, http://info.geonet.org.nz/display/volc/Volcanic+Alert+Levels).
Table 7 Recommendation 14 “Understanding Volcanic
Hazard and Communicating Science Advice”, from the 17
recommendations suggested by MCDEM after Exercise
Ruaumoko (MCDEM 2008, p. 50–51)
• … there is a need for further analysis and/or translation of primary
science information to limit misinterpretation and to ensure it meets the
needs of all organisations.
• … there is a need to review local and national requirements for science
advice (in planning and response periods), and look at processes for
achieving better co‐ordination and synchronisation, while also meeting
individual agency requirements.
Recommendation 14: MCDEM should lead work with CDEM Groups
and science agencies to:
14.1 Consider options for integrating local
and national science capabilities
and processes
14.2 Facilitate collaborative planning by science
agencies, including universities, for
post‐event science investigations
CDEM and science agencies should:
14.3 Champion collaborative public‐good research
to enhance the scientific understanding of
the Auckland volcanic system, in particular
its precursor and eruptive behaviours
14.4 Support on‐going volcanic hazard education
about the extent, size and nature of hazards
and impacts.
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nature had GeoNet (the monitoring arm of GNS
Science, legislated to provide official advice) sitting as
a separate sub-group to the volcanology sub-group
which encompassed university and other Crown
Research Institutes, Science agencies (e.g. MetService)
and GNS Science; with meetings between these
groups conducted via regular teleconferences. An
extremely positive aspect of the AVSAG structure was
its inclusiveness (McDowell 2008), however it was
seen as being too “cumbersome during the escalation
of events in the scenario” (Cronin 2008, p. 6). In the
early stages of the exercises, information flow between
these two sub-groups was adequate. However, as the
crisis progressed, information transfer reduced
considerably and there was poor communication
(Cronin 2008; McDowell 2008). This represents a
significant issue for effective individual and group
situational awareness and would have impacted upon
shared mental models of the situation, resources
required, and decisions to be made (Section 3).
 AVSAG tasks were driven by questions provided by
the Auckland EOC and the National Crisis
Management Centre. As stated by Cronin (2008),
very little additional advice was provided, even
though some questions were not relevant. At times
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concentrating on these questions participants felt
they “had excluded additional important comments”
(Cronin 2008, p. 5). The exception to this was the
social sub-group, who did pre-empt questions.
When we consider this in light of our discussions in
Section 3, we can see that this information sharing
is typical of explicit information requests and repre-
sents a weak shared mental model of the issues and
information needs, much like the ad-hoc
communication characterised in the response to
Ruapehu 1995–1996 (Section 3.3, & Paton et al.
1998a). This demonstrates a need to conduct further
activities to develop shared mental models further,
and strengthen inter-organisation networks and
communication.
 Due process outlined in AVSAG was followed in
situations when novel approaches would have been
more appropriate (Sections 3.1 and 3.3). For
example, as the exercise reached crisis, AVSAG
followed process by only responding to explicit
requests from the decision makers (Cronin 2008), to
the point that events actually superseded their
responses. Failure to recognise the implications of
future status on the changing need for information
represents a failure of situational awareness (in
terms of future status), and weak shared mental
models (understanding other demands on the
recipient; Section 3). The in-house GNS Science Re-
view also cautioned that very structured meetings
could constrain science discussion, which would
thereby limit full debate and exploration of novel
considerations and more creative decision making
processes. This highlights how decision making
undertaken within normal scientific research (long
time for decisions, considerable debate, more analyt-
ical decision processes) differs from that in emer-
gency management environments (rapid
decisions for public safety in high risk/low time
contexts which call for more recognition primed
and intuitive decision processes). It was thus felt
that the AVSAG process was good for ‘peace-time’
but unwieldy “when rapid response is required”.
 At the crisis point of the exercise, as evacuation
planning occurred, AVSAG was “side-stepped”
despite there “being new scientific information to
hand about the eruption location and possible
eruption styles” (Cronin 2008, p. 4). This was a
direct reflection of the tri-partite structure of
AVSAG failing at the heat of the crisis, and GeoNet
carrying out two roles: 1) as the monitoring arm
within AVSAG, and 2) being mandated to be the
main information provider to government, the latter
of which took priority. The escalation of the crisisresulted in a perception that time was too short for
wider deliberation (Cronin 2008; p. 5), and resulted
in a focus on the rapid assessment and decision
making in relation to technical data alone
(McDowell 2008). This however resulted in a lack of
integration across the wider volcanological
community represented in the volcanology
sub-group of AVSAG, and thereby a breakdown of
shared situational awareness (Section 3.2) and an
artificial division between these scientists (McDowell
2008).
 The role of liaison officers (GeoNet duty officers) at
the Auckland Group EOC and NCMC was vital for
communication, and information sharing, (see
Sections 3 and 4). Auckland Civil Defence and
Emergency Management Group (ACDEM)
(McDowell 2008) identified that it was highly
beneficial to have a scientist in the GEOC as they
provided instant integration of science advice into
their decision making. The presence of the liaison
officers would have enhanced the situational
awareness of the emergency managers, and
communication within the GEOC most likely moved
towards an implicit supply of information by the
liaison officer as they recognised a need for their
advice. However, as discussed in Section 2.1, as the
crisis progressed the information delivered by the
two liaison officers diverged, an artefact of the
breakdown of shared situational awareness between
their two dispersed geographical locations as the
time and risk pressures increased. As stated by
Cronin (2008), p. 7, with this approach “there is no
guarantee that the two EOC’s will receive the same
advice”, and in the exercise this resulted in actions
by the NCMC that were a surprise to the Group
EOC. This demonstrates the importance of
consistent science advice due to the impact any
divergence may have upon cohesive integrated
emergency management decision making and
response. From this, the reviews identified a need for
policy to be developed for periods of extreme urgency
to ensure “only one representative communicates the
same message to National and Group controllers”.
 Reviews also identified a need for clarity around
probabilities and uncertainty, and that there had
been a use of geological terminology and
phraseology that was not understood by emergency
management, resulting in the recommendation to
identify what the emergency managers need and
how they use this information (see also Doyle et al.
2014a, b). As stated by MCDEM (2008), p. 50, “there
is a need for further analysis and/or translation of
primary science information to limit misinterpretation
and to ensure it meets the needs of all organisations”.
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noticed, and a need for clarity around
communication and reporting channels, as well as
ensuring documentation was readily available for
participants not able to attend meetings. This is vital
for maintaining good shared situational awareness of
the evolving crisis.
 Work load was identified as an issue for responding
scientists due to their dual roles (both response
and day-to-day roles) as well as the multitasking
demands placed upon them within the EOC. This
indicates a need to consider the use of multiple liaison
officers within an EOC, to share these demands, while
both assisting with the maintenance of situational
awareness within the EOC regarding developments of
the science and data inputs. However, messages must
be consistent when there are multiple liaison officers
within an EOC, to prevent the potential divergence of
advice discussed above.
From these observations, and this comprehensive test-
ing of AVSAG, specific recommendations for improving
the science advice provision and response included
(MCDEM 2008; McDowell 2008; Cronin 2008; Table 7):
 The need to investigate the options for a merged
volcanology-subgroup encompassing the GNS
Science/GeoNet monitoring arm in such a way that
the overall group is not too cumbersome, but such
that all expertise can be involved in the response.
 Recognising and ensuring that both the volcanology
and monitoring sub-groups of AVSAG have access
to the same data resources (which we also note
would help improve shared situational awareness).
 That MCDEM must work with CDEM and Science
agencies to 1) consider options for integrating local
and national science capabilities and processes, 2)
facilitate collaborative planning by science agencies,
including universities, for post-event science
investigations (Smith 2009, p. 76) while also meeting
individual agency requirements (MCDEM 2008, p. 50).
 Adopting a structure where GeoNet (which has an
always active on-call duty team) has the main
advisory role, whilst “co-opting external AVSAG
scientists and the GeoNet team into a volcanology/
monitoring SAG” as needed (Cronin 2008, p. 9).
This aims to ensure the wider NZ expertise can
contribute to the understanding of the situation and
incorporates locally based scientists into the
response process.
These observations clearly illustrate the benefits of exer-
cises that truly test scientific response, VSAG structures,
and inter-organisation communication and decision-making responses. The ‘split’ observed between the moni-
toring and wider volcanology subgroup of AVSAG is
interesting to consider in the context of the influence of
group identity (Hogg 1992) and the ‘stereotyping of in-
and out- groups’ that can affect collaboration in a response
(Paton et al. 1998a) and reduce the capacity to develop
swift trust.
As briefly introduced in Section 2, in response to these
exercise evaluations, Smith (2009) (on behalf of MCDEM),
outlined a potential alternative model provided by a NZ
Volcanic Advisory Panel (NZVAP), to avoid such a break-
down in communication, as well as to integrate local and
national science research response (Figure 2b). This model
was developed through a MCDEM facilitated dialogue be-
tween volcanologists to identify how the skills of scientists
in the range of different organisations (including univer-
sities, Crown Research Institutes, consultancies and coun-
cils) can be integrated “in support of a national science
agency such as GNS Science that has responsibilities
under the National CDEM Plan for providing warnings
and advice” (Smith 2009, p. 76). This national advisory
model aims to mobilise science capability while remaining
responsive to local CDEM needs (ibid, p. 77), and the
intention of such a national mechanism is not to override
any existing scientific or planning advisory groups at the
local level, but rather that it would be complementary and
“provide for a level of consistency for how New Zealand-
wide science capability is mobilised when a large-scale sci-
ence response is needed”. Other benefits of such a group
include: a) facilitating coordinated post-event investiga-
tions and data sharing arrangements, b) providing stra-
tegic advice on research direction and priorities, c)
fostering connectivity across the physical and social sci-
ences, and d) supporting alignment between researchers
and research users (see also Jolly and Smith 2012).
This proposed model was still under consideration and
discussion when the Canterbury earthquake sequence
started in September 2010. This sequence required an ex-
tensive response of many of the same scientists and agen-
cies, and thus the development and implementation of
such a NZVAP model has been put on hold until exten-
sive reviews of the inter-agency response to those earth-
quakes were conducted (including both a Royal
Commission of Inquiry and a Coronial Inquiry) and until
the science advisory process during those earthquakes,
and the more recent volcanic eruptions of Te Maari in
2012, have been fully evaluated by agencies and through
various research projects in process (see also Section 2).
However, until those real event reviews are available, Ex-
ercise Ruaumoko represents a clear case study of how ex-
ercises can be used to test a new VSAG structure,
identify issues in that structure and pave the way for the
development of a new structure. As stated by MCDEM
(2008), p. 55 “there were major achievements in the
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wouldn’t have occurred without the context of the exer-
cise”. After formalisation of any new NZVAP structure,
the next step should be test this through another exercise
(of a different scenario) to complete the exercise cycle
(Figure 3) and implement any lessons from that as part of
a regular evaluation of science advisory mechanisms.
6 Discussion: a new exercise structure for
volcanology
It is important that science agencies both participate in
and lead exercises of all scales and types (Table 4) due to
the many benefits discussed above. In particular, benefits
can arise from smaller exercises that may be more suit-
able for restricted budgets. For example a full-scale exer-
cise the scale of Ruaumoko would require significant
exercise resources in terms of both personnel and costs.
For that exercise, GNS Science contributed both exercise
writing and preparation time of approximately 2 weeks for
2 people, and in the exercise itself approximately 18 hours
of meeting time (plus associated data analysis time) for
10 people. Thus, in total, approximately 300 hours of
professional time were contributed towards exercise de-
velopment, exercise play, and evaluations and debriefs (de-
tailed costs were not available, thus these are estimates
only). This equates to approximately 70,000-100,000 NZD
for a science agency to participate in a full scale CDEM
led national exercise like Ruaumoko with realistic time-
lines (including a full week of exercise play). Equivalent
costs for MCDEM (as exercise writing management team,
as well as in response) would be in the range of 1–1.75 full
time equivalent (FTE) staff members for 12 months of
exercise preparation, escalating to 3FTE for the last 3
to 4 months and then full team engagement in the
exercise play itself. These FTE staffing costs would be in
addition to operational expenses (in excess of approxi-
mately 200,000 NZD) for workshops, briefings, travel, re-
port writing, and public education material. Meanwhile
for regional/local CDEM, typical costs for participating in
such an exercise would depend on their exercise involve-
ment, ranging from 500,000 NZD for full scale participa-
tion in a Tier 4 exercise (Auckland CDEM during Exercise
Ruaumoko) through to 5000–10,000 NZD for smaller
Tier 1 and Tier 2 exercises (e.g. Wellington Regional
Emergency Management Office, based on regular Exercise
Phoenix series). Thus it is important that agencies con-
sider conducting a cost-benefit analysis when deciding the
scale of an exercise, being aware that benefits from con-
ducting exercises include the considerable reduction of
personnel and financial costs during a real response due
to the increased capability developed in the exercise.
It is clear from the above that full scale participation
in CDEM led national exercises, while extremely benefi-
cial for the future response capability of scientists andvolcanologists, can be very expensive in terms of re-
sources and professional time. It is thus important that
scientists do not just participate in CDEM led exercises,
practicing in liaison roles and on expert panels, but also
exercise their own agency and inter-agency response as
well. By exercising within their own agencies, scientists
can enhance intra- and inter-agency collaborations. By
developing, writing and leading an exercise, scientific
agencies can design exercises to meet their core goals in
terms of capability building and competency testing; to
tailor them to meet their needs for skills and process de-
velopment; to meet their available budget by providing
opportunities to develop smaller, less costly exercises to
test processes within just a small team (e.g. a monitoring
team could practice their response, analysis and decision
making responses). These smaller exercises are still
greatly beneficial to response capability and to improved
shared mental models of the response environment
within that team. However they currently occur in an ad
hoc manner, with no co-ordinated Tier structure like
that of the CDEM sector (Section 5). We thus suggest
there is a need to formalise such a structure for volcan-
ology to help promote a regular exercise cycle, and to
help integrate such processes into CDEM frameworks,
as well as to encourage documentation of such exercises
for future shared use, and propose an equivalent scale as
follows:
 Level 1 – In-house: within-team or within-group
exercise. E.g. exercise the response of a specific team, such as
an agency monitoring team or a university research
group, to an event such as a lahar breakout and the
associated opportunity for the rapid collection and
dissemination of data. This could involve story
boarding the response and requirements through a
facilitated table top exercise, through to a functional
exercise or practice run involving mobilisation, data
collection procedures and radio communication tests. Level 2 – In-house: within-agency exercise. E.g. exercise the agency response to an eruptive
episode, including the various responding monitoring
teams within this organisation, such as: geochemistry,
geophysics, geodesy, and social sciences, as well as
those responsible for issuing monitoring statements,
developing forecasts, and providing impact and
warning advice to the public and key decision
makers. Through this, an organisation can develop
an understanding of the dependencies that each of
these teams or groups have upon each other and
their shared requirements to perform their role, as
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addition, abilities to continue the agency’s day-to-day
duties alongside this response can be explored and
issues identified. Examples of such an exercise range
from a small facilitated table top exercise to practice
a monitoring meeting and the resultant change of an
alert level, through to an inject led functional exercise
utilising monitoring injects throughout a prolonged
period of time. Level 3 – Regional or National: across-agency
exercise. E.g. exercise members of a national volcanic science
advisory group, for a long duration volcanic unrest
period. This advisory group would bring together
individuals from across universities, agencies and
technical organisations, as well as any nationwide
monitoring agency, and thus it provides an
opportunity to exercise both their roles and others
within their agencies and organisations who may
support them in their role. For example, exercising a
volcanic ash fall event provides an opportunity to
practice interaction across agencies from the
volcanological, meteorological, public health,
veterinary and farming sectors, and beyond. Level 4 – International: across-agency exercise. E.g. exercise the response to large scale ash cloud
hazard event. In a manner similar to Pacific Wave,
this could involve members ranging from the local
weather monitoring and forecast organisation,
through to local and international volcanologists,
meteorologists, and aviation authorities. Through
this the international sharing of information
necessary for local, regional and national ash cloud
monitoring and forecast can be exercised, as well as
collaboration in the preparation and delivery of any
aviation warnings.
Each of these exercise levels could involve only the sci-
entific agency, or other civil defence and responding or-
ganisations, and may range from orientation to full scale
exercises (see Table 4), as appropriate. We use the term
‘Level’ to avoid confusion with the term ‘Tier’ used in
the emergency management led exercises. These exercise
levels may feed in to any of the CDEM Tier 1 to 4
scales, as desired by the co-ordinating scientific agency.
For example, a scientific agency may choose to only ex-
ercise their landslide assessment team (Level 1) as part
of a Tier 3 CDEM earthquake exercise, or they could
choose to exercise all their responding teams to this sce-
nario, including, for example, a full inter-agency tsunamiexpert panel (Level 3). The key difference for our pro-
posed exercise structure is that the exercise planning
and writing is led by the scientific agencies, and not a
local, regional or national civil defence agency, and thus
is directed by the core goals and competencies that the
scientific agency wishes to develop.
Further to these four levels, we also suggest that volca-
nologists exercise with a different hazard. For example, a
team of volcanologists could run 1) a table top flood ex-
ercise themselves (with the scenario provided by the ap-
propriate agency) ‘acting’ as flood scientists; or 2) watch
or participate in a full scale flood exercise, again playing
the role of flood scientists. By exercising an ‘unfamiliar
hazard’ (e.g. the rapid, high frequency, sudden onset
flood), volcanologists cannot make their usual assump-
tions, and so the process can help to identify issues and
unrealistic expectations of response capability. It also
gives these volcanologists an opportunity to learn tech-
niques, procedures and ‘tips’ from these other scientific
communities that may be more experienced in emer-
gency response roles. For example, some flood and wea-
ther agencies contain scientists who are very practiced at
regularly switching from their ‘research’ role to a ‘re-
sponse’ role, forming rapid response teams, and working
alongside CDEM and local governments on a regular
basis.
7 Concluding remarks
Through a review of the literature on emergency manage-
ment team response, decision making, mental models,
situational awareness and exercising, particularly in the
NZ context, we argue that to truly enhance the science re-
sponse during a disaster, science agencies, and science ad-
visory groups, must learn from emergency management
agencies and embark on a suite of training activities in-
cluding exercise and simulation programs within their
own organisations, rather than solely participating as ex-
ternal players in emergency management activities.
Through this in-house training, the future response cap-
ability of science advisory groups and agencies can be en-
hanced, while also developing their true understanding of
the needs of the emergency managers and other key deci-
sion makers. This enhanced understanding may lead to a
modification of existing scientific programmes and pro-
jects, with a view to enhance outputs to meet decision
makers’ needs in advance of a crisis rather than during the
crisis itself. Further, by participating in these activities we
can enhance the response capability by developing shared
mental models across the team about the response issues,
demands, tasks and interpositional knowledge for mem-
bers within and across teams.
These exercises not only provide opportunities to
practice communications and plans and enhance these
team mental models, but also for scientific agencies to
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could be included (Doyle and Johnston 2011; Doyle
et al. 2014a & Doyle et al. 2014b), and for other agencies
to be able to develop associated contingent planning. In
addition, exercise and scenario planning can also help to
answer if we are doing the right science for the response
as well as for the advancement of science. There is thus
a necessity for organisations to provide structure, re-
sources and time to help facilitate and promote such
training activities, as well as to encourage performance
management techniques within a response, such as role
swapping, while also acknowledging our responsibility as
scientists to fulfil this response role effectively.
Beyond exercises for response it is also important to
acknowledge that such exercises can advance our scien-
tific knowledge and strategies for response performance,
learning, and decision competencies. Volcanic scenarios
provide an important case study for these research exer-
cises into human behaviour, learning and communica-
tion, due to their highly uncertain nature in terms of
expected scale, scope, timing and impacts (e.g. Doyle
et al. 2011; Dohaney 2013).
There is also a need, through such research exercises,
to identify ways to develop ‘swift trust’ in an event. Trust
is intrinsic to shared mental models, distributed decision
making, and information sharing in a response, particu-
larly during situations of high uncertainty. Identifying
strategies to create swift trust goes beyond volcanic re-
sponse management, and has implications for develop-
ing effective multi-agency collaboration when agency
representatives find themselves managing any hazard
crises without prior contact. For information sharing it
also has implications as it moves people from an indi-
vidualistic perspective (‘my information is best’) to an
acknowledgement of the collective perspective and role
(‘my information is one piece in the big picture of re-
sponse’).
Endnotes
a“The “boiled frog” scenario is referred to often in dis-
aster and business communities to describe “creeping”
disasters and crises, it describes a frog that when placed
in a pot of cold water which is being gradually heated,
will fail to recognize the increasing danger and thus get
boiled alive. However, if this proverbial frog is put dir-
ectly into hot water, it will recognize the dangerous situ-
ation and jump straight out of the pot. This metaphor
thus describes a number of problems that can arise with
creeping disasters: failing to recognize the accumulation
of many small changes which can amount to a major cri-
sis; normalization bias; and personnel fatigue and per-
formance issues for long duration events”. (Doyle et al.
2014b, p. 86).bA Black Swan event (Taleb 2007) describes those
events that 1) exceed our expectations (an outlier), 2)
have extreme impacts, and 3) are often ‘rationalised by
hindsight’. They are hard-to-predict, surprising rare
events beyond “the realm of normal expectations”, often
characterised by high uncertainty. The probabilities of
such events are often hard to compute due to the nature
of the small probabilities involved. A recent natural haz-
ard event which could be considered as a Black Swan
event is the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and
subsequent Fukushima nuclear power plant crisis; al-
though some state this may not satisfy the first criteria
(surprise) of a Black Swan (Lewis 2012). The impact to
aviation, travel, and trade during the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull
eruption is another example of a Black Swan event.
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